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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest in research on advocacy 
success, but limited attention has been paid to the role of public opinion. We 
examine how support from the public affects advocacy success, relying on 
a new original data set containing information on public opinion, advocacy 
positions, and policy outcomes on 50 policy issues in Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Claims by advocates are 
measured through a news media content analysis of a sample of policy issues 
drawn from national and international public opinion surveys. Our multilevel 
regression analysis provides evidence that public support affects advocacy 
success. However, public opinion does not affect preference attainment for 
some of the lobbying advocates whose influence is feared the most, and the 
magnitude of its impact is conditional upon the number of advocates who 
lobby on the policy issue in question.
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Introduction
Whether interest advocates are able to influence “Who gets What, When, 
How” (Lasswell, 1936) has been the concern of policy commentators and 
academics for as long as the discipline of political science has existed. It is a 
crucial question not only because actors and groups with various purposes 
and objectives invest vast resources into lobbying with the hope of advancing 
their policy goals but also because their potential influence has important 
implications for democracy. A frequently expressed concern is that lobbying 
groups and elites, who do not represent all kinds of interests in society equally 
(Olson, 1971; Schlozman, 1984), may twist policy outcomes away from what 
would be in the interest of the general public (Dornhoff, 2013; Gilens, 2012). 
Consequently, the question of whether and how advocacy groups influence 
policy making has played a prominent role in many of the classical works on 
political systems (see, for example, Bentley, 1908; Truman, 1951) as well as 
in a number of recent studies (see, for example, Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 
2015; Bunea, 2013; Burstein, 2014; Dür, Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2015; 
Furlong & Kerwin, 2005; Klüver, 2013a; Yackee & Yackee, 2009).
At the same time, a growing body of research suggests that policy does 
represent public opinion to a significant degree, in the United States (see, for 
example, Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Shapiro, 
2011) as well as in Europe (see, for example, Rasmussen et al., 2015). 
Because policy makers’ chances of staying in office depend on their support 
among voters, it might not be surprising that they respond to the public. They 
thus seem to pay attention to both the general public and the variety of actors 
that advocate their policy preferences when making policy decisions, weigh-
ing the benefits they obtain from both against each other. It is, therefore, 
plausible to expect that interest advocates’ chances of seeing their policy 
preferences realized might partly depend on the level of support for their 
positions among the public.
Yet, apart from a few important exceptions (see, for example, Dür & 
Mateo, 2014; Smith, 2000), the literature on advocate influence rarely con-
siders the potential impact of public opinion. This may seem surprising given 
the important lesson from the literature on advocate influence and success 
(for recent literature reviews, see Lowery, 2013; Smith, 1995) that the out-
come of lobbying is not simply a function of the characteristics of the actors 
themselves but also of the characteristics of the policy issues and the prefer-
ence alignment of other actors (see, for example, Baumgartner et al., 2009; 
Mahoney, 2007). Because the success of individual advocates depends, for 
instance, on how conflictual the lobbying environment is (Dür et al., 2015; 
Mahoney, 2007), lobbying should be regarded as a “collective enterprise” in 
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which actors rely not only on themselves but also on the actions and charac-
teristics of likeminded lobbying advocates to achieve their policy goals 
(Klüver, 2013b). These findings underline the importance of taking the 
potentially crucial role of the public into account when studying advocacy 
success, not only for normative reasons, because political decision makers 
should be responsive to citizens (Dahl, 1971), but also to obtain an accurate 
picture of the power that lobbyists have over policy.
In this article, we focus on this important issue and argue that advocates 
depend not only on support from “friends” among other advocates but also on 
the preferences of the general public. Moreover, we identify a set of factors 
that might condition the influence of public opinion on advocate success. 
First, we propose that public opinion might play a stronger role if a higher 
number of lobbying actors are active on the issue, making it salient in the 
public debate and transmitting information about public opinion to policy 
makers. Second, different types of advocates might depend on public support 
for their attainment of policy to different degrees. Specifically, experts and 
individuals, who possess fewer resources that are valuable to political elites 
for securing electoral success, should be strongly dependent on the views of 
the public. The same goes for groups representing diffuse interests, whose 
power is based on their ability to provide legitimacy to decision makers 
among the parts of society that feel represented by them. Being able to influ-
ence public opinion is, thus, a crucial factor on which they rely in their advo-
cacy efforts, which should make the lobbying success of these groups strongly 
dependent on public opinion. In contrast, groups representing special inter-
ests, such as particular industries, can offer campaign contributions and 
expertise in exchange for political influence. These benefits might outweigh 
the costs of enacting unpopular policies by helping politicians gain electoral 
support through other channels. Thus, the lobbying success of these groups 
might be less contingent on public support for their desired policies.
To test these hypotheses, we present a research design that includes data 
on public opinion, preferences of the policy advocates, and policy outcomes 
on policy issues spanning across a broad range of policy areas. Altogether, 
our new original data set contains information on lobbying activity of more 
than 800 actor appearances in the news media on 50 specific policy issues. 
For each policy issue, we systematically map the policy positions of interest 
advocates, public opinion, and final policy outcomes. This allows us to exam-
ine whether public support affects lobbying success, and to scrutinize under 
which circumstances and for which types of actors it does. The 50 issues 
concern specific policies and are selected in such a way that we have varia-
tion in important issue-level factors that may affect the opportunity 
for advocates to be successful, namely, whether or not the public supported 
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policy change on the issue, the media salience of the issue, and the type of 
policy.
The results of our multilevel regression analysis show that public support 
for advocates’ policy preferences does indeed matter for their success; how-
ever, the effect is conditioned by a number of factors. As hypothesized, the 
effect of public support for an advocate’s policy goal on advocacy success 
increases with the size of the advocate community on a given issue. The argu-
ment that interest groups representing diffuse interests and individual advo-
cates depend on public opinion for their preference attainment also finds 
empirical support. Moreover, in line with our expectations, the advocacy suc-
cess of specialist interest groups does not depend on public opinion. Thus, 
although having the support of the public plays a role in lobbyists’ chances of 
seeing their policy goals realized, the effect is contingent on characteristics of 
the advocates themselves and the community of lobbyists.
Advocacy Success: The Preference Attainment 
Approach
Our study uses a behavioral definition of advocates in which we include 
actors based on their observable policy-related actions (Baroni, Carroll, 
Chalmers, Marquez, & Rasmussen, 2014). This means that rather than being 
concerned with traditional membership interest associations only, we include 
a broad range of actors that lobby on a given issue. We refer to these actors as 
“interest advocates” and differentiate between advocates of diffuse and spe-
cial interests, experts, and individuals in our analysis. All the examined actors 
have in common that they are “external” to the political system; in other 
words, we exclude political parties, party officials, and the public administra-
tion in the concerned countries.
While studies of tactics and strategies play a prominent role in interest 
group research (Bunea & Baumgartner, 2014), the study of advocacy influ-
ence has received somewhat of a revival in recent decades, with scholars 
presenting a more optimistic view with respect to the challenges of measur-
ing influence and encouraging empirical research in the area (e.g. Dür & De 
Bièvre, 2007; Klüver, 2013a). Different approaches to measuring influence 
have been proposed and used, including attributed influence, process tracing 
in individual case studies, and the assessment of preference attainment based 
on information about preferences and policy outcomes. We use the latter 
approach and compare the claims and demands concerning a range of policy 
issues raised by interest advocates in the news media with the outcome on the 
respective policy issue (Dür, 2008). The preference attainment approach cer-
tainly does not allow us to examine all aspects related to power and influence 
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in politics (see, for example, Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 
1974). Therefore, although scholars using the approach often refer to both 
influence and lobbying success (see, for example, Bunea, 2013), we restrict 
ourselves to the term “lobbying success” here (see, for example, Mahoney, 
2007). In contrast to influence, the concept of success does not assume cau-
sality but recognizes that convergence is not necessarily a direct result of 
specific actions exerted by a given lobbying actor (Dür et al., 2015). Thus, 
our approach does not require visible behavior for identifying “lobbying suc-
cess,” and allows for it to happen through different channels of access. Using 
the preference attainment approach in a large-N study has the advantage that 
external validity is higher than in single, qualitative case studies or in studies 
of perceived influence, in which it is possible that actors over- or underesti-
mate influence levels (Dür, 2008).
The Role of Public Opinion in Advocacy Success
A range of studies has sought to determine which conditions make it more or 
less likely for advocates to see the policies they desire adopted (see, for 
example, Bunea, 2013; Dür et al., 2015; Klüver, 2013a; Mahoney, 2007). 
One of the key conclusions is that lobbying success is not only a question of 
the attributes of the individual advocates but strongly influenced by the con-
text in which lobbying takes place. One factor that has emerged as very 
important in the preference attainment literature is the extent to which the 
other lobbying advocates support an actor’s position on an issue. An actor’s 
likelihood of failing to attain its goals is higher for issues with directly 
opposing camps among the advocates (Mahoney, 2007), and business groups 
fare better if they “face limited opposition from other actors” (Dür et al., 
2015, p. 24). Similar conclusions have arisen in the literature on perceived 
influence: Furlong (1997) outlines how coalition building is regarded as 
important for increasing the effectiveness of formal methods for exerting 
group influence. These findings strongly suggest that the efforts of lobbyists 
to affect policy must not be regarded in a vacuum, but that the context and 
support network play a crucial role in their chances of seeing their demands 
fulfilled. Our focus is on a factor that has been largely overlooked in this 
context, namely, public opinion.
We argue that the public should play an important role in advocacy suc-
cess, as politicians ultimately depend on the public for winning votes to 
secure reelection (Mayhew, 1974). And indeed, a range of studies provide 
empirical support for policy responsiveness to public opinion (e.g., Erikson 
et al., 1993; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Rasmussen et al., 2015; Shapiro, 2011). 
According to Lohmann (1993), it may even be “puzzling that rational 
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political leaders with majoritarian incentives would ever respond to political 
action” (p. 319) by actors or groups representing only parts of society (see 
also Burstein & Linton, 2002). However, interest groups, businesses, and 
other lobbyists are able to provide valuable resources to political decision 
makers in the form of campaign contributions, expertise, and legitimacy (see, 
for example, Bouwen, 2004). Yet, the policy preferences of advocates may be 
in conflict with the preferences of the public. In such cases, policy makers—
assuming that their actions are strongly motivated by electoral success—have 
to weigh the benefits of listening to lobbyists with the costs of implementing 
unpopular policies. As mentioned above, lobbyists might often be able to 
provide resources that directly counter the negative effects of implementing 
(not implementing) an unpopular (popular) policy on electoral support, for 
instance, legitimacy among the section of society that an advocate represents 
or support for the election campaign. Yet, if a large majority of the public 
disagrees with an advocate, policy makers might not consider these resources 
sufficient. Thus, the likelihood that the benefits that listening to an advocate 
can provide will outweigh the costs of public opposition to the policy should 
decrease with the amount of public opposition to the policy. In other words, 
the likelihood that policy makers will implement a policy change or maintain 
the status quo in line with an advocate’s preference should increase with the 
proportion of the public that agrees with the advocate.
Research linking public policy to both advocacy and public opinion is 
sparse (for reviews, see Agnone, 2007; Burstein, 2010). In a meta-analysis of 
studies aiming at explaining policy decisions or the results of policy decisions, 
Burstein and Linton (2002) find that those that take account of both forces 
constitute a small minority. Public opinion is largely ignored in the literature 
examining preference attainment of interest groups on large-N samples of 
policy issues, not least as a result of the difficulty of linking data sources on 
interest groups, public opinion, and policy outcomes. However, the few stud-
ies that do incorporate data on both advocacy and public opinion give us 
reason to believe that public opinion is far from irrelevant. Gray, Lowery, 
Fellowes, and McAtee (2004) found some evidence that public opinion and 
interest groups interact to influence policy liberalism in the U.S. states in one 
of the two years examined but focused on the density of the group populations 
as a whole. Moreover, findings show that public opinion affects interest group 
mobilization and strategies (Kollman, 1998; Rasmussen et al., 2014), although 
we do not know whether such behavior results in interest group success. 
According to Wilson, the constraints of public opinion may even be so severe 
that groups are limited to making “demands that are, or can be construed as, 
legitimate or within reason by the standards of the larger publics that will 
eventually learn of them” (as cited in Dür & Mateo, 2014, p. 1205).
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Smith’s (2000) work provides strong evidence that business success in 
lobbying is constrained by public opinion even when businesses act in a uni-
fied manner, where the conventional wisdom leads us to expect public opin-
ion to matter the least. To him, the likely reason is that issues with high 
business unity are often ideological, partisan, and salient to the public, which 
provides politicians with strong electoral incentives to be responsive. This 
claim underlines the importance to study advocacy success and the role of 
public opinion at the level of specific policy issues, where the characteristics 
of the issues can be taken into account. Moreover, the study calls for an inves-
tigation of the impact of public opinion on the preference attainment of other 
lobbying actors than businesses, including interest associations and individ-
ual advocates such as experts and concerned individuals. Many of these 
actors represent the views of specific sections of society rather than the pub-
lic as a whole, on whose electoral support parties and political leaders in 
government ultimately depend. We therefore test the following hypothesis 
using data on the views of the public and a range of advocates on a set of 
specific policy issues:
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of congruence between the position of an 
advocate and the policy outcome on an issue increases with the proportion 
of the public that has the same position as the advocate.
This positive effect of public support on lobbyists’ chances to attain or 
maintain their preferred policy should exist alongside the influence of the sup-
port among the advocate community, which previous research has shown 
(e.g., Dür et al., 2015). In other words, we expect that advocates are most 
likely to see their demands implemented if both the public and a large share of 
the lobbying community share their positions. However, the impact of public 
opinion may not be independent from the actions of the lobbying community. 
Instead, we argue that public support for an advocate’s position should have a 
stronger impact on the actor’s likelihood of policy attainment if the number of 
actors that lobby on the issue is higher. A high level of lobbying activity 
implies strong pressure on policy makers to listen to the demands of the vari-
ous actors involved. At the same time, the high advocacy intensity likely 
increases the salience of the policy issue in the public debate. As a result, the 
public may be more likely both to form opinions on the issue and to find out 
whether their demands are heard and implemented into policy. For these rea-
sons, policy makers may be especially cautious to take public opinion into 
account when deciding to change or maintain a policy in cases where a large 
number of lobbyists are involved. This is particularly relevant if the lobbying 
activity occurs through the media, or is reported by it, as in this study.
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This line of reasoning extends work by Agnone (2007) on how protest 
may amplify the effect of public opinion on policy decisions. Using the case 
of the environmental movement in the United States, she argues that the 
effect of any change in public opinion on the volume of environmentally 
friendly legislation is likely to be stronger when it is accompanied by an 
increase in the number of proenvironment protests. Our argument differs in 
that we consider all lobbying advocates with a position on an issue, rather 
than only one side of the debate, as both support for and opposition to the 
actor’s policy goal among other lobbyists should create “noise” around the 
policy issue and thereby increase decision makers’ attention to public opin-
ion. Dür and Mateo (2014) present a similar argument in a case study of the 
ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. They find that a 
high volume of interest group activity on the issue played an important role 
in making it salient to the public and in transmitting public opinion to politi-
cians. We therefore expect that the lobbying community influences the pref-
erence attainment of an advocate not only through its degree of support for 
the actor’s demand but also by amplifying the importance of having the sup-
port of the public:
Hypothesis 2: The impact that support of the public has on the likelihood 
of congruence between the position of an interest advocate and the policy 
outcome on an issue increases with the number of advocates that voice an 
opinion on the issue.
The effect of public opinion on preference attainment might also vary 
between different types of advocates. As discussed above, lobbying actors 
provide a variety of types of resources to political decision makers in 
exchange for influence, including funding, information, expertise, and legiti-
macy (see, for example, Bouwen, 2004; Klüver, 2013b), which might out-
weigh the costs of ignoring public opinion. However, there is variation in 
both the resource levels of the different types of advocates and the nature of 
resource exchanges between them and the political decision makers. This, in 
turn, may imply differences in the level of support from the public that the 
actors need in order to see their policy preferences realized.
Individual lobbying advocates—such as private persons and experts—
generally draw on a more limited amount of resources than collective actors 
such as membership associations and firms. Individual advocates are less 
likely to deliver resources to political elites in the form of campaign contribu-
tions in exchange for political influence. This may mean that having support 
from the general public is a factor that plays a stronger role in determining 
whether they ultimately end up attaining their preferences than for actors who 
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have the possibility to provide substantial amounts of resources to political 
decision makers.
Within the population of collective actors, we can distinguish between 
those that represent special interests and those that represent diffuse interests. 
Groups representing special interests have a well-defined constituency such 
as specific socioeconomic or producer interests, in contrast to diffuse interest 
groups, such as consumer and environmental groups, whose constituencies 
are not clearly defined and whose mission is typically linked to societal con-
cerns more generally (Olson, 1971). Diffuse interest groups, thus, represent a 
broad range of societal interests (Dür & Mateo, 2014). A reason for why dif-
fuse interest groups get access to political decision-making processes is pre-
cisely that their strong roots in civil society help politicians ensure legitimacy 
vis-à-vis the sections of the public who feel represented by these groups, and 
ideally the public at large (see, for example, Klüver, 2013b). Before elec-
tions, it is valuable for political candidates and parties to be embraced by 
such organizations, and in-between elections, diffuse interest groups can act 
as links between policy makers and the wider public. On the one hand, such 
associations can transmit information about public preferences, which may 
be valuable for politicians to secure public support. On the other hand, they 
can help policy makers gain acceptance and support for their decisions among 
wider sections of the public. The incentive for policy makers to take the 
demands of diffuse interest groups into account should, therefore, depend on 
the extent to which they are supported by the public and, hence, are able to 
bestow legitimacy.
In contrast, lobbying advocates representing special interests do not act as 
representatives of the public as a whole. Exchanges between them and politi-
cians are more likely than for diffuse groups to be dominated by a logic in 
which expertise and/or monetary contributions are exchanged for access and 
political influence for the groups’ specific constituencies. Groups represent-
ing special interests are also more likely than many diffuse groups to enjoy 
insider access to the administrative apparatus of the political system in the 
form of being strongly represented, for instance, in governmental advisory 
bodies (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2015). For them, the support 
of public opinion may, therefore, be less of an important currency when it 
comes to getting their views heard by the political decision makers. Our third 
hypothesis is, therefore, as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The impact that support of the public has on the likelihood 
of congruence between the position of an interest advocate and the policy 
outcome on an issue is stronger for individual advocates and advocates 
representing diffuse interests than for those representing special interests.
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Data and Method
We focus our analysis on five countries: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. All these countries are European parliamen-
tary democracies and represent differences and similarities with respect to 
state–society structures. A prominent classification of such structures in interest 
group research has been the distinction between corporatist and pluralist sys-
tems (Schmitter, 1974). Corporatist systems are known for providing institu-
tionalized access into the decision-making structures to key groups, whereas 
pluralist countries have more open and competitive structures for advocacy 
interaction with the political system (Eising, 2004; Öberg et al., 2011). Even 
though there may be differences between corporatist and pluralist systems in 
the relative access of different types of advocates to the political system, we 
would not necessarily expect differences in the success rates of an average 
group within these systems (Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 2015). Yet, our design 
allows us to test whether variation in state–society structures affect lobbying 
success. The U.K. system is pluralist, whereas the remaining systems are cor-
poratist in nature but display different degrees of corporatism (Siaroff, 1999).
It is often a challenge in the interest group literature that there is no sampling 
frame of all possible policy issues. Instead, scholars rely on different sources 
for sampling policy issues, for example, legislative databases (Beyers, Dür, 
Marshall, & Wonka, 2014; Burstein, 2014), the media (Bernhagen, 2012), or 
asking groups themselves on which issues they work (Baumgartner et al., 
2009). Whereas all these different approaches have their strengths, they also 
come with certain weaknesses, such as excluding items that have not made it 
onto the legislative agenda or into the media, or on which there is no interest 
group activity. In our case, the issues come from a pool of issues on which 
public opinion measures are available. From the time period between 2005 and 
2010, we first collect a large number of items from public opinion surveys that 
fulfill a number of criteria, which include that they relate to very specific policy 
issues rather than overall policy areas and present the respondents with a sim-
ple choice whether to implement a suggested course for future action. Moreover, 
the responses to each question are measured on an agreement scale and concern 
national (as opposed to EU, state, or local) policy competences. From the 
resulting sets of policy issues, we subsequently select 10 issues in each country. 
Rather than choosing our issues randomly from all issues fulfilling our selec-
tion criteria, we select them in a way that ensures variation across key charac-
teristics that might influence actors’ preference attainment. The selected issues 
vary on the following dimensions: (a) issue type (redistributive, distributive, 
and regulatory), (b) media salience (low and high), and (c) public support for 
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(vs opposition to) policy change. By ensuring such variation, we aim to opti-
mize our ability to draw conclusions that are generalizable to a broader set of 
policy issues. We provide a list of all included policy issues alongside their 
classification along the three dimensions in the online appendix.
Using available public opinion polls as a sampling frame means that, in 
some respects, we are more inclusive than studies relying on legislative data-
bases, because public opinion polls often ask about issues before they enter 
the legislative agenda. Forty-three of the 50 policy issues in our sample had 
not been introduced as bill proposals at the time the public opinion question 
was asked, and many never reached the legislative agenda. This means that 
our study provides insight into the factors influencing whether advocates see 
any of their policy goals implemented, as long as they are covered by the 
news media, rather than only their preferences on issues that have already 
entered the parliamentary debate, in which case the determining factors may 
be different. Yet, this selection strategy may mean that we are less inclusive 
in other respects, given that polls are not conducted about all issues but pre-
dominantly focus on issues that are more salient (see also Burstein, 2014). 
This limitation has the benefit that studying issues with a certain level of 
salience may ensure that the public has formed an informed opinion about the 
issues in the first place (for a similar argument, see Gilens & Page, 2014).1 
Yet we need to be aware that salience may affect what causes preference 
attainment. Selecting issues in such a way that there is variation in the media 
salience of the issues is, therefore, important to us. We measure the media 
salience of a policy issue by the number of newspaper articles referring to it 
in one major nationwide daily newspaper in the respective country (Politiken 
in Denmark, Sueddeutsche Zeitung in Germany, The Guardian in the United 
Kingdom, Dagens Nyheter in Sweden, and de Volkskrant in the Netherlands). 
More specifically, we conduct a Boolean keyword search for articles pub-
lished 1 month prior until 1 month after the date when the respective survey 
question was asked, using the media databases LexisNexis and FACTIVA.2
In line with recent responsiveness research (see, for example, Gilens, 2012; 
Lax & Phillips, 2012; Monroe, 1998; Petry & Mendelsohn, 2004), we define 
a policy change as having taken place if the specific call for policy action to 
which a survey question refers at t0 was subsequently implemented at t1. In 
line with Gilens (2012), we use a time frame of 4 years between t0 and t1, 
allowing all items in our sample an equal period of time to experience a policy 
change, no matter whether they were asked at the beginning or end of our 
2005 to 2010 sampling period. To determine whether the policy was imple-
mented, we evaluate information provided by online newspaper archives, 
interest groups, legislative databases, and governmental webpages.3
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Measuring Advocacy in the News Media
To measure advocacy on a policy issue, we manually content code newspaper 
articles retrieved through a search equivalent to the one conducted for the 
media salience measure, except that we take a longer time frame into account 
and consider an additional media source in each country: Jyllands-Posten in 
Denmark, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany, The Daily Telegraph 
in the United Kingdom, Svenska Dagbladet in Sweden, and NRC Handelsblad 
in the Netherlands. This way, our media content analysis codes articles from 
two national broadsheet news sources in each country, one left-leaning and 
one right-leaning. This is important to reduce potential biases in the types of 
advocates represented in different news media. We code all articles from 
these sources that were published between 1 month before the respective 
survey question was asked up until the policy was implemented or, if there 
was no policy change, until 4 years after the question was asked. We measure 
actor policy positions on the basis of reported statements and actions in these 
articles. In the initial coding scheme, the unit of analysis is a statement, which 
may be either in favor, neutral, or against policy change on the respective 
issue. Only one statement per actor is coded in an individual newspaper arti-
cle, but several statements by the same actor from different articles may be 
included. Because our focus is on lobbying by actors external to the political 
system, all statements made by policy makers, party members, and other 
political actors who may have direct, institutionalized influence on the policy 
outcome are excluded. As a result, the focus of our analysis is on advocacy by 
firms, interest associations, experts, and individuals.4 More detailed informa-
tion and the codebook used to code the statements and the specific actor types 
can be obtained on www.govlis.eu.
For the empirical analysis, we aggregate the data from the statement level 
to the level of an actor within a policy issue (the actor-per-issue level), of 
which we have 847 observations.5 We only consider statements that are 
clearly in favor or against the implied policy change, excluding all neutral 
statements. Moreover, we exclude 27 of the 847 observations on the actor-
per-issue level in which actors made opposing statements on the same issue 
in different newspaper articles, leaving us with 820 observations in our final 
data set. Our dependent variable indicates whether the position of an indi-
vidual actor on a policy issue is congruent with the policy. Congruence means 
either that an actor favored a policy change and the policy change occurred or 
that an actor opposed policy change and it did not occur.
Independent Variables
To analyze whether public opinion influences the likelihood of congruence 
between an actor’s position and the policy, we calculate for each actor on 
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each issue the proportion of the public that supports the actor’s position. 
The measure in our data set ranges from .08 to .92, and higher values on 
the variable indicate stronger support from the public for the actor’s posi-
tion. The measure only takes into account public opinion in favor or against 
policy change, excluding survey respondents replying with “don’t know” 
rather than implicitly assuming that this category of actors opposes policy 
change.6
To measure whether the effect of public support on preference attainment 
is conditional upon the number of lobbying advocates, we interact our mea-
sure of public support with the number of actors on an issue expressing a 
position either in favor or against a given policy change. Because the distri-
bution of the total number of actors per issue is right-skewed, we use the 
natural logarithm of this variable.
Finally, we interact public opinion with the actor type to determine whether 
the effect of public opinion on preference attainment varies between actor 
types. According to our theoretical predictions, we distinguish between advo-
cates representing individuals (either private persons or experts), advocates 
representing special interests, and those representing diffused interests. 
Advocates of special interests refer to firms as well as institutional, business, 
and professional interest groups and labor unions, whereas diffuse interests 
include the remaining set of membership associations such as groups repre-
senting public, hobby, religious, and identity interests.
Control Variables
We control for a set of additional variables that might influence convergence 
between advocates’ preferences and the policy outcomes. As mentioned, an 
actor’s likelihood of preference attainment might be strongly affected by 
whether its position is shared by other advocates. Therefore, we control for 
the degree of support for an actor’s policy position from other advocates in 
the lobbying community. It is measured by the proportion of advocates with 
the same policy position as the respective actor among all other advocates 
who made statements on the respective issue. Thus, if for a given policy issue 
there are three advocates with positions in favor of and only one with a posi-
tion opposing policy change, the actors favoring policy change have a sup-
port level of two thirds from the other lobbying advocates, whereas the 
opposing advocate has no support at all. We also use a crude measure of 
potential conflict on an issue by controlling for the logarithm of the total 
number of actors that took a position on an issue, which is the same variable 
that is interacted with public opinion to analyze whether its effect is condi-
tioned by the amount of lobbying.
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In addition, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the 
statements of an actor are in favor of a policy change as opposed to the status 
quo. Findings from the literature on lobbying success show that most issues 
witness a strong status quo bias (Baumgartner et al., 2009) and that it is 
harder for advocates to change than preserve the status quo (Mahoney, 2007). 
We further measure for each actor on each policy issue how many articles 
include one or more statements by an actor, because actor activity might be 
positively related to preference attainment.7 Moreover, by considering the 
main effect of the actor type variable, we are able to examine whether there 
are overall differences in preference attainment between the three groups of 
advocates (see, for example, Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 2015; Bunea, 2013; 
Dür et al., 2015; Golden, 1998; Yackee & Yackee, 2006).
We also control for the public salience of the examined issues by relying 
on the media salience measure used to select our policy items. To control for 
a possible country bias in the overall volume of news coverage, we standard-
ize the measure within each country, so that higher numbers indicate higher 
media attention. When decisions are shielded from the public eye, the public 
pressure on politicians to deliver certain policies might be lower, making it 
easier for groups to get what they want (Mahoney, 2007). However, the pub-
lic visibility of an issue might affect advocacy preference attainment in a 
positive manner to the extent that there is convergence between what the 
public and the advocate want (see, for example, Dür & Mateo, 2014).
We also control for policy type, the idea being that policies generate dif-
ferent levels of conflict and controversy, which might affect both the mobili-
zation and lobbying success of interest advocates (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007; 
Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014). Lowi’s (1964, 1972) distinction between regu-
latory policy (which constrains and allows specific activities), distributive 
policy (which allocates resources to particular social groups), and redistribu-
tive policy (which transfers resources from certain groups to others) is still 
one of the most prominent typologies in the public policy literature.8 Due to 
differences in levels of contestation and public involvement, the likelihood of 
interest group lobbying success may vary between the issue types (Dür & De 
Bièvre, 2007). Finally, we include country dummies to control for the poten-
tial effect of differences in state–society structures between the countries on 
congruence.
Analysis
Table 1 displays the results of three multilevel logistic regression models 
with random intercepts for the policy issues. The estimate of the policy issues 
intercept variance shows that the probability of congruence between actors’ 
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statements and the implemented policies varies across the policy issues. In all 
our models, we obtain a significant likelihood-ratio test comparing the model 
with a logit regression without a random intercept, which indicates that the 
multilevel model has a significantly better fit.
In Model 1, we include all our main variables together with our control 
variables. The model displays a significant positive effect of public support 
on preference attainment. Thus, the model provides strong evidence in sup-
port of our first hypothesis regarding the impact of public opinion. The prob-
ability of an advocate’s congruence increases from .42 (±.09) to .67 (±.08) as 
the share of the general public supporting its claims increases from the mini-
mum to the maximum of observed values.9 At the same time, the significant 
positive effect of the other actors’ support variable provides strong evidence 
for the finding in the existing literature that support from “friends” among 
other advocates crucially increases actors’ chances of success. As the propor-
tion of the supporting actors increases from 0 to 1, the predicted probability 
of congruence of the actor’s statements with the policy increases from .26 
(±.09) to .75 (±.07).
That advocates are most likely to see their demands implemented if both 
the public and a large share of the lobbying community share their positions 
is illustrated in Table 2. The table lists the predicted probabilities of congru-
ence for scenarios in which support of the public and other advocates is low 
and high, that is, at one standard deviation below and above the mean, respec-
tively. Importantly, the likelihood of preference attainment for an advocate 
increases from .37 (±.07) to .72 (±.06), when we move from low to high sup-
port on both variables, reflecting an increase of almost 100%.
In addition, the model reveals a significant status quo bias. The probability 
of congruence for actors favoring policy change is significantly lower (.38 
[±.07]) than for actors preserving the status quo (.74 [±.07]). We also find 
significant differences between the different actor types, but not necessarily 
Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Congruence at Low and High Levels of Support 
From the Public and Other Actors.
Public support
 Low High
Other actors’ support Low .37 [.30, .44] .50 [.42, .58]
High .60 [.52, .68] .72 [.66, .79]
The values are predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. The 
probabilities are calculated based on the predictions in Model 1. “Low” and “high” support 
levels are at one standard deviation below and above the mean.
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in the direction we would have expected based on the existing literature: 
Advocates representing diffuse interests have a significantly higher likeli-
hood of congruence than advocates representing special interests. While our 
sample is constructed in such a way that we have issues of both high and low 
salience, it is possible that the low congruence rate of special interests results 
from the fact that all our issues have received a certain degree of media expo-
sure. Model 1 also displays a highly significant effect of media salience. 
Interestingly, congruence between an actor’s statements and implemented 
policy is higher, rather than lower, for policy issues that are salient in the 
media. Hence, at least for the actors appearing in the media, salience seems 
to have a positive impact on their degree of success. For low salience issues, 
the model’s predicted probability of congruence is .45 (±.09), while for high 
salience issues it is .65 (±.09).
Advocates lobbying on distributive issues are more likely to be successful 
than those lobbying on redistributive ones, yet the difference is only signifi-
cant at the .10 level and their success rate is not different from those actors 
lobbying on regulatory issues. Instead, success is significantly less likely on 
redistributive issues than on regulatory ones, presumably due to the high lev-
els of conflict and public salience of issues to do with redistribution (results 
not shown). The model does not show significant effects for the number of 
advocates per issue, nor for the activity level of the advocates. Finally, the 
model does not reveal any significant differences between the countries. This 
supports evidence in recent research that system-level variation might matter 
less than sometimes thought when analyzing interest group behavior and its 
effects (Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 2015).
In Models 2 and 3, we test the hypotheses about how the effect of public 
opinion on preference attainment is moderated by various variables. Because 
in nonlinear models the interaction effect cannot be reliably evaluated by the 
sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the included interaction term 
itself, we turn to the graphical display of the predicted probabilities for the 
substantial interpretation of the conditioning effects (Ai & Norton, 2003).10 
In Model 2, we include the interaction term between public support and the 
logarithm of the number of lobbying advocates per issue to analyze whether 
the effect of public support is amplified by the number of advocates that 
voice an opinion on the issue (Hypothesis 2). Figure 1 plots the predicted 
probability of congruence along the entire range of public opinion at one 
standard deviation below and above the mean of the logged number of advo-
cates per issue. The figure clearly reveals a significant positive effect of pub-
lic support, but only for issues with a high number of lobbying advocates. 
This finding indicates that the effect of public support is affected by the size 
of the advocacy community lobbying on the respective issue in the media.
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In our final and fully specified model (Model 3), we include an additional 
interaction effect between public support and our categorical actor type vari-
able to analyze whether the effect of public support on preference attainment 
varies for the different actor types (Hypothesis 3). Although we do not have 
evidence for significant differences in the effect of public support between 
the groups at the .05 level, our results indicate that, as expected, the average 
marginal effect is only positive and statistically significant for two of our 
groups, namely, experts and individuals as well as advocates representing 
diffused interests. Figure 2 shows that for both types of advocates, the prob-
ability of preference attainment increases with the level of public support. In 
contrast, we do not find a significant effect of public support on preference 
attainment for special interests.
In line with our theoretical expectations, it appears that, indeed, the prefer-
ence attainment of some advocates is dependent on public support. 
Presumably because individuals and experts are generally not able to provide 
financial resources or legitimacy to policy makers, decision makers seem 
more likely to follow their advice and demands if it means that they will also 
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of congruence across public support for high and 
low numbers of advocates per issue.
Predicted probabilities are based on the average marginal effects of Model 2. The values for 
low and high number of actors are at one standard deviation below and above the mean.
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satisfy the majority of the public. Moreover, diffuse interests are more likely 
to be able to deliver legitimacy and be listened to by policy makers the more 
these advocates are supported by the general public. In contrast, the likeli-
hood of preference attainment for advocates representing special interests 
does not depend on public support. In many cases, the financial resources that 
special interests can offer might be able to sway policy makers even in the 
absence of support from the larger public. This finding is important as it 
seems to confirm the fear often voiced in the public debate that money can 
buy influence, even in established democracies.
Conclusion
A common picture of lobbying is one in which advocates persuade decision 
makers to follow their interests rather than act in line with the preferences of 
the general public. The idea is that decision makers may be willing to ignore 
the views of the general public and instead listen to interest advocates, who 
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of congruence across public support by actor 
types.
Predicted probabilities are based on the average marginal effects of Model 3.
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provide valuable resources to them in the form of, for instance, expertise and 
financial support. Yet, we still know little about whether public opinion influ-
ences the likelihood that the adopted policies correspond to the positions of 
the interest advocates. Although the study of advocacy success has grown 
considerably in recent decades, the vast majority of the existing literature 
does not consider the impact of public opinion on preference attainment. We 
conduct such a study with a large-N design, using data on advocacy, public 
opinion, and policy on 50 different policy issues from Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The existing literature on group success makes clear that when actors or 
groups attempt to convince political decision makers to change certain policies, 
the context is a crucial factor to be taken into account. Confirming previous 
research, we find that the likelihood of advocacy success, that is, congruence 
between a lobbying actor’s or group’s policy preference and implemented pol-
icy, increases with the share of other advocates who support, rather than oppose, 
the actor’s position. However, we also find that advocates need more than a 
little help from their friends among the lobbying community. Public support for 
advocates’ policy demands is another important factor in their chances of pref-
erence attainment: We find evidence that advocacy success increases with the 
proportion of the public supporting the policy position.
These results reveal how constrained the potential of individual lobbyists 
to influence policy is. Policy makers are not very likely to follow the advice 
and demands of advocates who act in isolation, and in addition to the role of 
the community of lobbyists as a whole, the public needs to be considered. 
Our study thus connects research on advocacy success and on policy respon-
siveness to public opinion and highlights the importance of considering the 
other when analyzing one. It also reconciles evidence for the influence of 
interest groups and businesses on policy with the finding that public opinion 
shapes policy in many policy areas and countries.
At first sight, our results present good news for democracy: The preferences 
of the public play a role. However, we also find evidence that qualifies this 
statement: Public opinion does not seem to influence the chances of all actors 
to attain their preferences. In fact, the organized interests typically feared the 
most, namely, special interests such as businesses, appear to be independent of 
public support when making their demands heard by policy makers. This sug-
gests that such organized interests may be able to offer resources and benefits 
to policy makers, which outweigh the benefits of making policy that is congru-
ent with the views of the majority of citizens. It contrasts work from the United 
States, which found that the success of business in influencing the items on 
the legislative agenda depends on public opinion (Smith, 1995). Instead, we 
only find evidence that organizations representing diffuse interests 
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(organizations with a broad membership and strong roots in civil society) and 
individual advocates (i.e., private persons or experts) benefit from the support 
of public opinion in attaining their preferences.
Furthermore, we find evidence that the extent to which an advocate’s 
chances of preference attainment increases with public support depends on 
the number of advocates lobbying on an issue. A higher number of advocates 
is likely to increase the salience of an issue in the public debate and make it 
even more crucial for the decision makers to act in line with the views of the 
advocates that enjoy public backing on an issue.
Our 50 different policy issues represent a wide range of policy areas with 
variation in media salience and policy types, which have been shown to mat-
ter in government responsiveness to public opinion and interests groups. This 
means that our results are likely to be valid for a large range of policy issues. 
Moreover, we believe that the findings are generalizable to other European 
democracies, and potentially beyond, because the five countries included in 
our study vary along a number of institutional dimensions. Future research 
would make a valuable contribution by testing the hypotheses in other con-
text, such as the United States, where campaign contributions by lobbyists 
play a much more important role, and in newer democracies.
Even though the same groups may seek access in multiple arenas 
(Binderkrantz et al., 2015; Holyoke, 2003; Holyoke, Brown, & Henig, 2012), 
there is also scope for extending our approach to considering the impact of 
public opinion on advocacy success in other lobbying venues than the media. 
The news media constitutes a source of evidence for deriving actor positions 
that can be used in a comparative study such as ours, where the institutional 
access points of lobbying vary between countries. Moreover, measuring advo-
cates’ policy claims through a content analysis of major newspapers and relat-
ing them to actual policy means that we do not need to rely on perceptions of 
lobbying efforts and influence by advocates or political elites themselves. The 
downside of this approach is that we do not directly observe whether and how 
decision makers take the demands of individual advocates into account. Yet, 
observing such complex and rarely transparent processes is nearly impossible, 
making a large-N approach that relates inputs with outcomes and refrains from 
drawing causal inferences a viable and promising approach.
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Notes
 1. It is nevertheless important to point out that the public has had the option of not 
stating a clear preference either in favor or against a given call for action on an 
issue but to respond “don’t know.” In practice, respondents have made use of this 
option in our sample. On the 50 items, the share of respondents that have answered 
“don’t know” ranges from 0.6% to 36%, and it is above 10% for 44% of the issues.
 2. We do not record coverage for the entire observation period but for 2 months 
only to avoid bias that would result from the fact that those items that result in 
policy change later in the cycle are likely to receive higher coverage in the period 
preceding the policy change. In such cases, increased media coverage does not 
first and foremost reflect changes to the salience of the item in question but 
results from the debate of the specific bill proposals.
 3. An alternative approach would have been to rely on repeated measures of opinion 
over longer periods of time. Yet, because such longitudinal public opinion data are 
rarely available at the issue level, and because general proxies for opinion, such as 
the attitude toward the general policy area, are too vague measures to study pref-
erence attainment of individual groups on specific issues, we chose to use single 
measures of public opinion. We selected an observation period per issue that is 
relatively short (a maximum of 4 years per issue—and shorter if policy change 
happens earlier) and assume that change in public opinion is typically slow and 
gradual, unless major landmark events (such as Fukushima or 9/11) impact the 
views on an issue. Personal interviews which we led with policy officials who 
worked on the specific policy issues (response rate 82%) did not alert us to any 
such drastic shifts. Nevertheless, this does not rule out that smaller fluctuations 
in public opinion may have taken place. Yet we believe that, especially given the 
close, expert-led investigation into the cases, our single measures of public opin-
ion are acceptable proxies for actual opinion during the observation period.
 4. Initially, we also coded statements by international organizations, company employ-
ees, and other actors that did not belong to any of the listed categories and did not rep-
resent political parties or public authorities. However, we excluded these actors from 
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our analysis due to the low number of statements from such actors. Furthermore, we 
excluded all statements by unspecified actors mentioned in the news sources, such as 
“workers,” “teachers,” and so forth whose names were not mentioned.
 5. This means that an actor may appear several times in the data set if it makes 
statements on several policy issues.
 6. We also created an alternative measure of public support, which takes into 
account all respondents including “don’t knows.” The statistical results for this 
alternative specification are essentially identical to those which we present in the 
“Analysis” section.
 7. For this variable, we conducted an additional robustness check, controlling for 
the effect of outliers. We reestimated all our models dropping 11 outliers, defined 
as observations with values higher than two standard deviations above the mean 
of the activity variable. The reestimated models show essentially identical results 
to our original models, which are presented in the following sections.
 8. Lowi’s work also includes a fourth policy type: constituent issues that set the 
“rules of the game,” for example, foreign policy and administration of general 
services. Such policies often attract less attention by organized interests, which 
is why they are excluded from the present study.
 9. The reported predicted probabilities of congruence are calculated as the average 
marginal effects of public support from the fixed part of the model, with all other 
covariates held at their observed values in the data set.
10. In fact, in nonlinear models, the interaction effect could be nonzero even if the 
interaction term itself is not significantly different from zero.
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